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ABSTRACT: When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the 
opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inert-
ness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of 
this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some (many?) of them also accept, 
the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of 
a rival of mathematical nominalism, the mathematical realist position supported by the ‘Indispensability Ar-
gument’ —but I do this indirectly, by showing that the road toward it is not blocked by considerations from 
causation.
Keywords: Indispensability, Causation, Explanation, Nominalism, Realism, Causal Eliminativism.
RESUMEN: Al considerar el realismo matemático, algunos realistas científicos lo rechazan y expresan su simpatía por la 
aproximación opuesta, el nominalismo matemático; es más, muchos justifican esta opción invocando la inercia 
causal de los objetos matemáticos. El propósito principal de esta nota es mostrar que la adhesión de los realistas 
científicos a este nominalismo matemático causal entra en tensión con otra posición que algunos (¿muchos?) de 
ellos también aceptan, la doctrina del naturalismo metodológico. Al subrayar este conflicto, pretendo desequi-
librar la balanza a favor de un rival del nominalismo matemático, la posición realista matemática que apoya el 
‘Argumento de la Indispensabilidad’ —pero lo hago indirectamente, mostrando que el camino hacia esta posi-
ción no queda bloqueado por consideraciones sobre la causación—.
Palabras clave: Indispensabilidad, Causación, Explicación, Nominalismo, Realismo, Eliminativismo Causal.
It is silly to agree that a reason for believing that p warrants accepting p in all scientific cir-
cumstances, and then to add ‘but even so it is not good enough’. Such a judgment could only be 
made if one accepted a trans-scientific method as superior to the scientific method.
H. Putnam (1971, 356)
* Some of the ideas in this paper constitute developments and refinements of suggestions I made in my 
2012 book. I presented a version of the paper at the Annual Philosophy of Science Conference in Du-
brovnik in 2013, and I thank that audience (especially Mark Colyvan and Nic Fillion) for construc-
tive criticism. I’m grateful for comments on the most recent version to my audience at the workshop in 
Santiago de Compostela in Dec. 2016, in particular to Matteo Plebani, Xavier Donato, Otávio Bueno, 
Concha Martínez-Vidal, José Sagüillo, Susan Vineberg and José Luis Falguera.
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1. Introduction
Without assuming any particular theory of causation, let us call causal mathematical nom-
inalism (CMN) the kind of mathematical nominalism that denies ontological status to 
mathematical objects on the ground of their causal inertness.1 Some scientific realists be-
lieve that their realism cohabitates well with mathematical nominalism —as Colyvan put 
it recently, this “marriage” is “a popular option amongst philosophers of science” (2006, 
225)— and in many cases this nominalism is motivated by causal considerations. In this pa-
per I claim that a scientific realist’s sympathy for CMN is in tension with another position 
often endorsed by scientific realists —methodological naturalism, where the version of the 
doctrine relevant here is traditionally associated with Quine. By highlighting this conflict, 
my intention is to mount an indirect defense of what is perceived as the most serious oppo-
nent of nominalism, the mathematical realist doctrine supported by the so-called ‘Quine 
(-Putnam) Indispensability Argument’.2 To insist, the line of thinking I develop below is 
not meant to argue directly for indispensabilist mathematical realism; I only hope to show 
that it remains a viable option for a scientific realist.
In essence, I try to show that the conjunction of the following three positions is incon-
sistent (more precisely, that 1. and 3. taken together are in tension with 2.):
1. Scientific realism.
2. Causal mathematical nominalism (i.e., a form of mathematical antirealism).
3. Methodological naturalism.
Furthermore, I also gesture toward the idea that, given this tension, a reasonable option 
for the scientific realist is to drop 2., the nominalist component. This does open the door 
largely to becoming a mathematical realist indeed —although, as I said, my goal here is 
more modest than to (re)establish the Indispensability Argument (in any of its forms).3 
However, this seems to me a goal worth reaching, since indispensabilist mathematical real-
ists keep hearing the refrain ‘no causal efficacy, no ontological rights’; thus, it is important 
to demonstrate that they have no reasons to worry about CMN.
The harmony of the marital relation between scientific realism and mathematical 
nominalism has preoccupied others before, and the papers by Saatsi (2007), Busch (2011) 
and Busch and Morrison (2015) also deserve special mention. Yet these works don’t 
tackle the issue in the way I intent to do it below. First, they don’t ask about the very mo-
tivation for adopting CMN, and in particular don’t discuss the ‘eliminativist’ idea I take 
up in section IV.2. Second, the subsequent discussion examines the indispensabilist math-
ematical realist options of a scientific realist who is, specifically, a methodological natural-
ist. I’m going to be very careful about the specifics of these positions (and the labels) here, 
1 I regard CMN as a metaphysical (ontological) position, and I emphasize this since this causal inert-
ness has of course well-known epistemological implications; they are of secondary relevance here. See 
(B enacerraf 1973).
2 H. Field, a prominent mathematical nominalist, counts the Indispensability Argument as “the most 
compelling argument that has been offered against the nominalist position’, and also as “the only non-
question-begging argument” (1980, 4) for mathematical realism.
3 That would be to show that 1 and 3, together with some other assumptions (see below), entail (a cer-
tain version of) the negation of 2.
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since I grant that Busch and Morrison may be right to answer ‘no’ to the question they ask 
in their title ‘Should a Scientific Realist be a Platonist?’ —but note that I grant this under 
the assumption that ‘Platonist’ refers to traditional mathematical realism. Here, however, 
I will not discuss Platonism at all. In fact, I’ll consistently avoid using the label ‘Platonist’ 
altogether, because, unlike the authors above (and many others in fact), I take it that there 
are significant differences between (traditional) mathematical Platonism and (the contem-
porary) indispensabilist-naturalist mathematical realism. Although both realisms agree 
that mathematicalia are ‘abstract’, i.e., causally inert (‘intangible objects’, as Quine once 
called them), they disagree about a lot else. One major difference is that for an indispensa-
bilist realist “mathematical objects exist contingently” (Colyvan 2001, 4; Bangu 2012, 59), 
while this is of course not the case for a Platonist. The rejection of the aprioricity of math-
ematical truth is another, as is the acceptance of the blurring of the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction.4
To summarize: while I too suspect that a typical scientific realist may be able to dodge 
mathematical Platonism, the kind of scientific realist I consider here is not the generic type 
discussed in the above-mentioned papers, but one who is a methodological naturalist, and 
thus contemplates ‘marriage’ to an indispensabilist-naturalist mathematical realist (again, 
as different from a Platonic relation).
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section II, I will sketch the Indispensa-
bility Argument, emphasizing the role of Quinean methodological naturalism; then, in 
section III, I introduce CMN. Section IV examines a metaphysical issue usually left un-
touched in the literature —one’s fundamental justification for adopting CMN— and finds 
that this ultimate ground traces back to (simplistic) views about scientific explanation, at 
odds with scientific practice. I conclude in section V.
2. Indispensability and naturalism
Originating in Quine’s writings, and occasionally endorsed by Putnam,5 the Indispensabil-
ity Argument has been discussed extensively in the recent literature; thus, there is no need 
for a very detailed exposition of it. In a simplified form, it runs as follows:6 mathematical 
entities are indispensable to (the formulation of) our best scientific theories, and we ought 
to have ontological commitment to all (and only) the entities that are so indispensable. 
The gist of the argument is clear, but for my purposes here it needs some unpacking. The 
4 This contemporary (post-)Quinean indispensabilist form of mathematical realism is sometimes called 
scientific platonism; see Paseau (2007). There are other differences, discussed in Bangu (2012), where 
I also remarked that not just any form of scientific realism fits indispensabilist mathematical realism, 
but only a certain version of the realist doctrine, which I called ‘posit realism’. This is a subtlety I don’t 
discuss here. See Psillos (1999), and Chakravartty (2013), for how the scientific realist doctrine is cur-
rently understood.)
5 Putnam (1971, 347) is the clearest endorsement. But see Bueno’s reading of this passage (in his 
(2018)), along the lines of Putnam (2012). 
6 See Colyvan (2001). Baker (2009) calls the version of the argument in which mathematical entities are 
deemed indispensable to explanations, the ‘Enhanced’ Indispensability Argument. Leng (2010), Pin-
cock (2012) and Bangu (2012) contain recent substantial discussions of both versions.
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following is a version that renders more visible several features not immediately discernible 
in the above abridged variant:
Quinean naturalism advises that what we ought to include in our ontology can only be estab-
lished by applying the criterion of ontological commitment to the regimented versions of our best 
(true) scientific theories. If propositions featuring existential quantification over mathematical 
entities are indispensable to the formulation of these theories, then we ought to have ontological 
commitment to these entities. This conclusion follows under the additional assumption that con-
firmational holism is a viable view of scientific confirmation.7
A now conspicuous aspect of the Indispensability Argument is its intended audience: the 
scientific realists, i.e., those philosophers who hold (a) that our best, well-confirmed scien-
tific theories are to be taken literally, (b) that they are true, and (c) that their central terms 
refer.8 Such philosophers believe, for instance, that the unobservable entities posited by our 
best scientific theories (e.g., the electron field, the space time-curvature, and genes) should 
be granted full ontological rights. Yet, even more specifically, I aim at those scientific re-
alists who also believe that mathematical objects should be denied such rights (and this 
mainly for CMN-related concerns.)
In addition to (i) scientific realism, (ii) indispensability and (iii) holism, another key-
component of the Indispensability Argument as I understand it here is (iv) the criterion 
of ontological commitment. As is well known, this is a two-step recipe for detecting what a 
theory (often implicitly) says there is: it urges that we are committed to those objects taken 
to be values of the variables that a true theory quantifies existentially over —that is, the 
commitment is to the truth-makers of these theoretical statements.9 (This is the second 
step; the first consists in rewriting the theory in first order logic, and all this under the ad-
ditional assumptions that (v) this ‘regimentation’ is possible, and (vi) the framework allow-
ing it, first-order logic, is the best one suited for such a task.)
I have quickly parsed these six assumptions here in order to bring more sharply in view 
a seventh one, which plays the central role in what follows: Quine’s doctrine of methodo-
logical naturalism, the very foundation on which the Indispensability Argument is built. 
Although there has been a great deal of discussion about what this doctrine amounts to,10 
here I take it to consist in a couple of well-known general-methodological theses: that phi-
losophy is not prior, but continuous, to science, which means that natural science, and not 
a supra-scientific ‘first philosophical’ tribunal, is the arena where philosophical questions 
have to be asked and answered; in short, “the recognition that it is within science itself, and 
not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.” (Quine 1981, 
21). Most relevant in this context is the thesis that philosophical methodology should be 
7 From Bangu (2012, 147).
8 To stress, one who is not a scientific realist (i.e., one who is agnostic, for instance, about electrons and other 
unobservables) will dismiss mathematical objects (hence the Indispensability Argument) as a matter of 
course. Like other indispensabilists, I admit that what follows has no force against such a philosopher.
9 This way of presenting the argument has very recently come under scrutiny; Azzouni (2010, 25) dis-
cusses whether the idea of invoking ‘truth-makers’ is viable. Although I think it is, this would require a 
separate argument, so I’ll ignore this complication here; see Beebee and Dodd 2005 for discussion.
10 See Burgess and Rosen (1997), Maddy (1997, 2005, 2007), Paseau (2005, 2013). For detailed exegesis 
of Quine’s own views, see Hookway (1988) and Hylton (2007).
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informed by, and try to emulate, scientific methodology. This leads to the idea that scien-
tific practice takes precedence over philosophical critique —or, as Maddy put it, in case of 
conflict “it is the philosophy that must give” (1997, 161). The brand of naturalism relevant 
here has been described by Burgess and Rosen (1997, 65) as follows:
The naturalists’ commitment is … to the comparatively modest proposition that when sci-
ence speaks with a firm and unified voice, the philosopher is either obliged to accept its conclu-
sions or to offer what are recognizably scientific reasons for resisting them.
A naturalist philosopher of this (‘modest’) methodological kind determines her ontological 
commitments not by following any of the traditional metaphysical doctrines (such as ‘ma-
terialism’, or ‘physicalism’), but by seeking to find what is assumed to exist by the best scien-
tific theories. These are the theories judged within the scientific practice as being, on balance, 
the best (the simplest, of widest scope, most predictive and explanatory, etc.) Moreover, as 
the proponents of this form of naturalism constantly stress, the doctrine is not blindly sub-
servient to science. On the contrary, it leaves open (even encourages) philosophical inter-
ference within scientific matters. However, not just any interference is allowed, but only 
that which results in a betterment of science. What is opposed is the interference motivated 
by the constraints dictated by adherence to a particular philosophical doctrine (and CMN 
is a case in point here; this remark will become relevant later on.)
3. Causal mathematical nominalism and the ‘Eleatic Principle’
With this sketch of the Indispensability Argument in place, we can now move on to de-
scribe CMN. This view makes causal efficacy the decisive condition of ontological commit-
ment. Thus, an entity’s ability to participate in causal interactions is postulated to be the 
necessary and sufficient condition for its existence. From now on, and following the litera-
ture (Oddie 1982; Colyvan 2001, 2005; Azzouni 2004, 2010), I will refer to this criterion 
as the ‘Eleatic Principle’.11 Following other mathematical realists, and for the sake of the 
argument here, I’ll bracket out the sufficient condition as unproblematic, and I shall focus 
only on the necessary condition.12
Let me add two caveats before I begin to discuss the problems announced at the out-
set. First, this formulation of CMN leaves out one complication: the fact that the view is 
often associated with an additional requirement, spatio-temporal localization.13 I mention 
11 Oddie (1982) coined the phrase ‘the Eleatic Principle’. Advocates of it include, among many others, 
Armstrong (1978, 5), Ellis (1990, 22), Field (1989, 68) and, more recently Azzouni (2004, 10): “I … 
argue for a version of the Eleatic Principle, the claim that, in some sense, everything there is has causal 
powers.” 
12 Colyvan (2001, ch. 3) makes an argument against the necessity part of the Eleatic Principle based on 
inductive considerations. Since I agree with Azzouni’s (2004, 155) and Marcus (2015) criticisms, I 
won’t discuss it here.
13 Both Rosen (2012) and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2011) discuss these characterizations together; less em-
phasis on them is laid by Chihara’s entry on ‘Nominalism’ in Shapiro (2005). Armstrong (1980, 149) 
also endorses “the doctrine that reality consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal 
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it here, although what I have to say below will not be affected by taking it into account; I 
believe that concentrating only on causal efficacy captures the spirit of this nominalist posi-
tion more precisely. As the terms ‘causation’ and ‘spatio-temporal’ are typically understood, 
they are virtually extensionally equivalent: anything that is located in space-time has causal 
powers, and vice-versa. But then, one might ask, what about space-time itself? Or, even more 
specifically, what about the individual points of the space-time manifold: are they located in 
space-time as well? Do they interact causally with other objects, or with other such points? 
These are difficult and pertinent questions,14 yet here I’ll put them aside by formulating 
CMN in a slightly restricted way.
The second remark: as is well-known, one wishing to resist ontological commitment to 
mathematical abstracta has several kinds of nominalism to choose from.15 Causal nominal-
ism, however, is prima facie more attractive than other nominalisms, because it is perhaps 
the best articulated version of this doctrine. One can appreciate this aspect of CMN if one 
reflects on what grounds the early nominalism of Quine and Goodman (1947). What they 
posit as the foundation for their “refus[al] to admit the abstract objects that mathematics 
needs” (1947, 105) is “a philosophical intuition that cannot be justified by appeal to any-
thing more ultimate.” (1947, 105; my emphasis). Yet to invoke such intuition amounts 
to little more than just foot stomping —and, at least by comparison, CMN does better. 
Not only does it offer a rationale for refusal, but the one it proposes is very appealing, and 
turned out to be decisively convincing for many scientific realists.
4. Why believe the Eleatic Principle?
Commendable as it may be as a philosophical strategy, the endeavor to offer a justification 
for adopting a fundamental metaphysical position —here, CMN— is also risky, as it opens 
up the possibility of further questioning. In this section I’ll do just that, and examine some 
possible justifications of the Eleatic Principle. Since the principle determines what onto-
logical stance one must embrace, a supporter of a rival stance is entitled to examine it, just 
as the nominalists have scrutinized all the seven premises of the Indispensability Argument. 
So, let us ask, why should one take causal efficacy as a necessary condition for existence? The 
nominalist is not out of answers here; yet, I argue, advancing them leads to serious tensions 
with naturalism.
4.1. Causation and explanation
When confronted with the key-question ‘what is special about causal efficacy?’, one typi-
cally brings in the issue of scientific explanation. So, the argument goes, if one is interested 
system”. And, according to Colyvan (2001, 22), “This conception of naturalism has an important con-
sequence (at least according to Armstrong): We should believe in only causally active entities (or per-
haps, more generously, potentially causally active entities).”
14 They have actually been asked, by various people critical of Field (1980). See Rosen (2012) for discus-
sions of them, as well as for the existence of some possible exceptions to the identification of causal ef-
ficacy and spatio-temporal localization.
15 Burgess and Rosen (1997) contains a book-length presentation of the nominalist options.
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in explaining natural phenomena, and one believes that the phenomena to explain are only 
the result of causal interactions, then one maintains that
(C) Only causal relations and entities have explanatory power.16
Therefore, according to claim (C), we need not grant ontological status to causally inert en-
tities and structures (mathematical ones included), since to do so is to take onboard more 
than is necessary to formulate the best scientific explanations. This is an important point, 
since now it is time to recall the constraints of methodological naturalism.
I will argue that the causal mathematical nominalist’s acceptance of claim (C) is sub-
ject to a couple of difficulties. And, given its role in supporting the Eleatic Principle (hence 
CMN), one should conclude that these positions themselves are significantly weakened. 
Moreover, both these difficulties will be traced back to a conflict with scientific practice, 
hence to a conflict with methodological naturalism.
The first problem is that many have argued that claim (C) is false, by invoking counter-
examples from science. A second difficulty, deeper and yet less discussed, can be presented. 
It does not claim that (C) is wrong; instead, it objects that it may not even be meaningful 
—by assessing it from the standpoint of scientific practice (more precisely, fundamental 
physics). I’ll take the two difficulties in turn.
So, the first challenge to (C) comes from the multitude of examples in the literature in 
which what does the explanatory work involves, at least prima facie, more than causal in-
teractions —that is, the explanandum doesn’t have an exclusively causal nature. Here per-
haps the most famous case of an explanation which does not (seem to) appeal to causal in-
teractions is Newton’s explanation of uniform motion —it happens when no forces act on 
a body. Even a minimal acquaintance with this literature reveals that many authors have 
taken, upon the examination of such examples, a definite stance against (C). To choose 
one name from a rather long list, Psillos says that “Causal inertia does not imply explana-
tory inertia” (2010, 951). The philosophical commentary on scientific explanation is rife 
with such pronouncements and examples abound. Since it is virtually impossible to discuss 
even one in the space of this paper, the best I can do is list several of them; see also Mancosu 
(2008). So, as examples, one can mention:
— topological explanations: Putnam’s (1975) famous square-peg-not-fitting-into-a-
round hole, Kitcher’s (1989) knot, Colyvan and Lyon’s (2008) honeycomb, Pin-
cock’s (2012) bridges.
16 This is the conclusion of what Brown (2012, 11-12) calls (without endorsing) the “standard argu-
ment”: “Numbers and other mathematical entities are outside of space and time, so they can’t caus-
ally interact with us. Unlike gravity, which makes things fall, and germs, which make us sick, numbers 
cannot make things happen. Since they cannot make things happen, they cannot explain them.” Note 
that the claim ‘[mathematicalia] cannot make things happen’ may not be as obvious as it seems. Earlier 
work by Steiner (1975) points out the possibility that, for instance, a (relation proved by a) mathemat-
ical theorem (understood as an abstract entity) might have some sort of causal effect. Rosen (2012) ex-
plains: “Suppose John is thinking about the Pythagorean Theorem and you ask him to say what’s on 
his mind. His response is an event—the utterance of a sentence; and one of its causes is the event of 
John’s thinking about the theorem. Does the Pythagorean Theorem ‘participate’ in this event? There 
is surely some sense in which it does.”
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— equilibrium explanations: Garfinkel’s (1981) predator-prey, Sober’s (1983) sex-ra-
tio.
— number theoretic explanations, drawing on the concept of (co-)primeness (such as 
Baker’s cicada (2005), or variations on the theme of the tile puzzle —why can’t one 
cover a rectangular bathroom floor with, say, 23 square tiles of equal area?— see 
Shapiro (2000, 217).
— optimization explanations: Bangu’s (2012, 2013) maximum-volume box and the 
‘banana game’, Baron’s (2013) Levy walk, as well as a host of other
— miscellaneous examples, harder to classify, in:
?? ??????????????????
?? ?????????????







Although the list is of course not exhaustive, it hopefully gives enough reasons to doubt (C).
Before I turn to the second difficulty, two observations. First, these examples have of 
course been challenged —together with the very idea that something else than causal rela-
tions has (or can have) explanatory power;17 for instance, Lewis [1986] is a prominent ex-
clusivist. It is however fair to say that this is a minority view, and that most philosophers 
today accept that something of mathematical nature, in addition to causal relations, can 
be explanatory in science. The other observation is that in order to reject (C), I only need 
to make the case for the claim that the explanatory power in those examples is ensured by 
some sort of mixture, of elements of both causal and non-causal/mathematical nature. If 
this is achieved, there is no need to argue for the further, stronger claim that it is mathe-
matics alone that provides this power (some of the examples in the list above, e.g., Lange’s, 
do attempt to show this).
So, if the argument from counterexample above holds, it is simply not the case that only 
causal relations (and entities) have explanatory power. Note that this non-exclusivism about 
explanation accepts the viability of causal explanation; the second difficulty arises once one 
denies this. This difficulty is more radical since it challenges the very idea of causal explana-
tion in general —by doubting the meaningfulness of the key notion occurring in (C), that 
of ‘causal relation’. What I’ll do now is assess, on behalf of the naturalist, what this phrase 
means (if anything) in scientific language. (Note that in doing this I just proceed according 
to the Quinean naturalist maxim cited above, which urges that we should assess philosophi-
cal claims “within science itself”.)
17 Recently, Lange (2013) has claimed that some of the examples above are in fact (exclusively) causal, 
while some of the ones he discusses are (what he dubs) ‘distinctively mathematical’ explanations (in 
which causes are ‘cited’ but not ‘exploited’). Although I have worries about this notion (and his exam-
ples), I won’t pursue them here.
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To be sure, the causal nominalist may simply reject the very legitimacy of such an as-
sessment. She may point out that the notion has an intuitive meaning in ordinary conversa-
tion —and this is enough. In this case, a conflict with naturalism ensues right away. But it 
is also possible that she may agree to such an assessment and, since this is the most charita-
ble attitude to have in dealing with the nominalist, I’ll assume that she does. Consequently, 
I will proceed to such an examination below. Its end result, however, will reveal that the 
nominalist finds herself, again, at odds with naturalism.
What leads to trouble is the simple remark that ‘cause’ is a term that does not seem 
to appear, or does virtually no work, in the canonic formulations of the fundamental sci-
entific theories.18 One then suspects that the reason for this situation is actually deeper. 
Two contemporary metaphysicians, Carroll and Markosian, present the issue neatly, as 
follows:
Some worry that the absence of the word ‘causes’ from the formulation of fundamental theo-
ries of physics is an indication that causation is merely a folk concept, maybe like the concept of 
a witch, that may get lots of use in ordinary conversation, but which has no application to the 
world since there are no witches. Our best physical theories include fundamental laws that are 
equations relating various properties to other properties but without explicitly stating that there 
are any causal connections or even that there would be certain causal connections if certain condi-
tions were to come to pass. (2010, 43; my emphases)
Unsurprisingly, some methodological naturalists are sympathetic to considerations like 
these. They are thus favorable to eliminativism about causation, a view holding “that cau-
sation sentences don’t succeed in describing the world, and so also hold that, strictly speak-
ing, nothing causes anything else.” (Carroll and Markosian 2010, 43). J. Shaffer summa-
rizes the view in terms congruent with methodological naturalism:
The main argument for eliminativism is that science has no need of causation. The notion of 
causation is seen as a scientifically retrograde relic of Stone Age metaphysics. (Shaffer 2016; my 
emphases)
Note, moreover, that much like non-exclusivism about explanation, eliminativism is by no 
means an obscure line of thought. One can provide a long list of illustrious supporters of 
it, which include Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell, whose famous description of causation 
—as “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously 
supposed to do no harm” (1912, 1)— is alluded to above. Significantly, Quine himself 
sounds like an eliminativist: “... the notion of cause itself has no firm place in science. The 
disappearance of causal terminology from the jargon of one branch science and another has 
seemed to mark the progress in the understanding of the branches concerned.” (1976, 242) 
Additionally, he also argues that “…a notion of cause is out of place in modern physics ... 
Clearly the term plays no role at the austere levels of the subject.” (1974, 6) “Science at its 
most austere bypasses the notion [of cause]...” (1992, 76). Moreover, there is a resurgence 
18 The well-known remark is Bertrand Russell’s: “All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causa-
tion is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences 
such as gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs” (1912, 1).
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of this form of skepticism about causation in the recent years. For A. Ahmed, for instance, 
“Causation is a pointless superstition” (2014, vii).19
Thus, since causation sentences can’t even describe the world, it is preposterous to re-
quire that they be used in explaining it —while this is exactly what (C) does. The charge 
against CMN is then that as long as the phrase ‘causal relation’ in (C) is empty, the claim 
itself is hollow. Once the core ideas of causation, and causal interaction, are removed from 
the (scientific) picture, what is left, as we saw, is mathematical “equations relating various 
properties to other properties.” This is bad news for the causal mathematical nominalist. 
Not only is the very notion of a causal relation (and causal efficacy) obscure, even mean-
ingless, but once one tries to make sense of the causal discourse, by (charitably) examining 
what such a philosopher may be talking about when using the folk vocabulary of causation, 
one discovers that it is actually mathematical equations! As is clear, from here the road is 
wide open to argue for mathematical realism via an Indispensability Argument.20
4.2. Reluctant realism
Even if these difficulties for claim (C) (and thus for CMN) are recognized, the nominal-
ists may retreat by asking: is the alternative package (1. scientific realism + indispensabil-
ist mathematical realism + 3. methodological naturalism) more stable? They point out that 
this may not be the case. After all, the scientist’s (and the naturalist scientific realist’s) com-
mitment to mathematicalia is a mere byproduct; in essence, it occurs only because of the 
(perhaps only possible) way we do successful science. The suggestion is, ultimately, that sci-
ence is somewhat forced, perhaps even ‘fooled’, into this ‘marriage’; and, as the nominalists 
see things, it is their duty to signal, and remedy, this ‘abuse’.
This strand of argument doesn’t come as a surprise to the indispensabilist realist; one 
may recall that this kind of mathematical realism is typically described as ‘reluctant’ real-
ism. This, however, is no reason to worry, since the indispensabilist realist can address the 
charges issued above. First, given Quine’s earlier endorsement of nominalism, his change of 
mind is in fact a sign of intellectual honesty. Second, the conclusion of the Indispensabil-
ity Argument is, strictly speaking, that science is committed to the existence of mathemati-
cal objects, not that it intends to prove their existence. Sure enough, both the scientific and 
the indispensabilist realist fully realize that physics, and science more generally, are prima 
facie about electrons and genes, etc., not numbers, sets and functions.21 And yet, what does 
it mean to say that science is about these things? Physics, for instance, is about the electrons 
in the sense that it is an investigation that aims to discover true statements about these en-
tities. (More precisely, quantum field theory is about the electron in so far as it asserts the 
true claim that ‘there are quantum fields, they have minimum energy excited states, and the 
electron is such a stable state, the negatively charged quantum of the electron field’.) Thus, 
given this aim, it turns out that physics’ best (holistically speaking) way to attain it is to use 
mathematics. The nominalist complaint —that science is somehow forced to marry math-
ematical abstraction, i.e., to make room for causally inert mathematicalia in its ontology of 
19 See also some of the essays in Price and Corry (2007). Norton’s paper proposed the ‘folk concept’ idea.
20 Recall that a host of several other assumptions need to be defended for this argument to hold.
21 The philosophers holding this view talk about the “nominalistic content” (Balaguer 1998, 141) of sci-
ence. See Psillos (2010) for doubts about the meaningfulness of this notion.
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causally efficacious electrons, fields and genes —is unfair. In fact, science gets a very good 
deal at the end of the day: at the cost of commitment to some mathematical abstraction, it 
gains, among other things, tremendous descriptive-representational power: how else to rep-
resent a quantum field other than as a mathematical object?22
At this point we can see what should be worrisome for the scientific realist. Her causal 
mathematical nominalism persuades her to adopt some illusory higher (first-philosophi-
cal, supra-scientific) perspective (expressed in claims like (C)) from which to oversee, and 
judge, scientific practice —or, more precisely, that part of the scientific practice having to 
do with the way theories and explanations are formulated. And this amounts to instituting 
an all-powerful, supra-scientific tribunal, in stark contrast with the gist of naturalism.
It is now hopefully clear for a naturalist scientific realist that mathematical realism of-
fers a better option for her than causal nominalism; while the latter just doesn’t square with 
her naturalism, the former integrates into the whole picture quite well. So, by now, both 
the advantages of mathematical realism, as well as CMN’s tensioned relation with an im-
portant aspect of scientific practice (what scientists take to be explanatory, what vocabu-
lary they use) should be obvious. Yet, one can still ask, do the nominalists then propose a 
revision of this practice? That is, can we categorize them as ‘revolutionary’ nominalists? (as 
Burgess and Rosen (1997) and Chihara (2005) call them). Even if this is so, I have already 
noted that naturalism is constitutively anti-dogmatic, not fearing ‘revolutions’, conflicts, or 
other calls for reform. When it comes to such disagreements, the key-question in settling 
them is how the revision of the scientific practice is justified. And, as is quite evident in this 
case, this revision is not proposed out of concern for the betterment of science —on the 
contrary, the scientific realist points out— but is grounded in extra/supra-scientific (phil-
osophical-nominalist) concerns instead. Therefore, if one remains within the confines of 
naturalism, one must conclude that such concerns are just immaterial.
5. Conclusion
The argument here amounts to the claim that the package (1. scientific realism + 2. causal 
mathematical nominalism + 3. methodological naturalism) is inherently unstable: a natu-
ralist scientific realist’s mathematical nominalism, when motivated by causation-related 
worries, is in conflict with her methodological naturalism. As is immediate, this is not an 
argument against nominalism per se; it only shows that the scientific realist has a choice 
to make, between her sympathy for this causal form of nominalism, on one hand, and her 
methodological naturalism, on the other. It is of course up to the scientific realist to decide 
which option is the most commendable here; but to my mind, it seems that accepting the 
second alternative is a better way out —i.e., that dropping CMN (rather than methodolog-
ical naturalism) is a more sensible choice, especially since, as I briefly argued in section IV.2, 
the alternative package (1. + 3. + indispensabilist realism) does not face similar cohabita-
22 The reference to (relativistic) quantum fields is not accidental; unlike the classical fields, such fields as-
sign to space-time locations mathematical objects (i.e., operators, whose eigenvalues can be other math-
ematical objects, e.g., scalars, vectors, spinors or tensors). Thus one strongly suspects that quantum field 
theories are not amenable in principle to the same nominalization strategies employed by Field 1980. 
(See also Malament 1982.)
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tion problems.23 In fact, taking the first option, i.e., to abandon methodological naturalism 
instead, seems to me a decision with many more worrisome consequences (e.g., the return 
of traditional metaphysics), whose analysis would deserve a separate paper.
To close. The familiar refrain ‘no causal efficacy, no ontological rights’ has inhibited 
many naturalist scientific realists’ tendency to become mathematical realists. This paper pur-
ports to to show that although tempting, this causal type of mathematical nominalism turns 
out to be rather problematic. In a nutshell, I have offered reasons to the effect that a scien-
tific realist attracted by the specific form of the (Quine-Putnam) indispensabilist mathemat-
ical realism discussed here (recall, as different from the traditional Platonism) has nothing 
to worry when it comes to the challenge from CMN. Thus, I suggest, the scientific real-
ist initially impressed by the Eleatic Principle should now feel encouraged to seek ‘divorce’ 
from the causal mathematical nominalist, and to consider ‘marrying’ a more stable ‘partner’, 
the indispensabilist mathematical realist. Finally, recall that the arguments presented here 
have proceeded in a charitable fashion, by accepting the sufficiency condition of the Eleatic 
Principle;24 thus, only the necessary condition has been scrutinized, i.e., the idea that the sci-
entific realists’ ontology contains only causally efficacious entities. In the end then, the exten-
sion of this ontology such that it includes causally inert mathematical objects is entirely com-
patible with scientific realism construed within the bounds of methodological naturalism.
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